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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SPENCER VAN NOY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 8627

RICHARD GIBBS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent,
Spencer Van Noy
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Respondent Spencer Van Noy will be
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant and Appellant Richard Worthen Gibbs will be hereinafter referr·ed to
as Defendant.
November 18, 1954, Plaintiff Spencer Van Noy and Defendant, Richard Worthen Gibbs, and certain other persons
executed articles of incorporation for a Uta!h corporation called
Valley Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. (R 89-96). Plaintiff and Defendant each subscribed for stock in the ~corpora
tion in an identical amount - 1950 shares. (R.,~89). Each appears
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in the articles of incorporation as an officer and as a member
of the Board of Directors. (R-92). The shares of plaintiff and
the defendant were fully paid. The Plaintiff and Defendant
each attested to that fact. (R-96). No ·stock •certificates were
issued at the time of incorporation. (R-61).
A few weeks after the corporation was organized internal
difficulties arose among the incorporators. (R-12, 13). At one
time or another the plaintiff and the defendant ·exchanged
words and each offered to buy the other out. (R-12, 13, 44, 67).
Thereafter a Mr. McDermond, (Referred to as McDermaid in
the transcript) one of the incorporators, negotiated with plaintiff on behalf of defendant Gibbs for the purchase by Gibbs
of plaintiff's interest in Valley Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. (R-12, 35). Defendant Gibbs knew what the corporate
interest of plaintiff was. (R-14, 26). Sometime prior to January
24, 1955, an instrument (Exhibit 1) was prepared by Mr.
McDermond and the sister of the defendant Gibbs. (R-71).
January 24, 1955, exhibit 1 was presented to plaintiff by Mr.
McDermond acting for defendant Gibbs. (R-'12).
The instrument states:
ASSIGNMENT
"For and in consideration of the sum of $2,000.00
payable $750.00 down, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $1,200.00 payable within ninety (90) days from date, I hereby sell, transfer
and assign all my right, title and interest to the shares
of Capital Stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., and do hereby appoint Richard Gibbs owner with
full power of substitution in the premises."
Dated this 24th day of January, 1955."
I sl Spencer Van Noy

Witness
2
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"A note payable and replacing this release will be
issued with other legal papers within (5) five days from
date above."
Is/ Spencer Van Noy
Exhibit 1 was then executed by plaintiff and he was then
given a check by McDermond in the sum of $750.00 as is recited in the instrument. (R-39). A copy of exhibit 1 was returned
to McDermond and was subsequently delivered to Dr.
Gibbs who «accepted" or ratified the deal. (R-73). Plaintiff
then ceased participating in the activities of the corporation.
Dr. Gibbs carried on the activities of the corporation. About
April 24, 1955, plaintiff made demand upon defendant for
payment of the remaining amount due to him under exhibit 1. (R-39, 20). Defendant indicated that he did not have
the money; that he fully intended to pay it; that plaintiff
should call him back in a week or so. (R-20, 39-40). During the
time when demand was made defendant at no time denied
owing the sum sought .(R-40). Defendant testified that he
discovered there was no written lease on the premises at 3793
South State Street. (R-30). Defendant finally refused to make
payment on the amount due to plaintiff and plaintiff then filed
action July 13, 1955 to collect the amount due. (R-1, 2).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
A STOCKHOLDER MAY SELL OR ASSIGN HIS INTEREST IN A CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FORMAL
EXECUTION AND TENDER OF A SHARE CERTIFICATE.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD
3
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AT 3793 SOUTH STATE STREET IN SALT LAKE COUNTY; THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS
TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD
AND EVEN IF THERE WERE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASEHOLD
IT IS NOT MATERIAL BECAUSE THE LEASEHOLD WAS
NOT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE BARGAIN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION
AND DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION OF THE AMOUNT ORIGINALLY PAID OVER TO
PLAINTIFF.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A STOCKHOLDER MAY SELL OR ASSIGN HIS INTEREST IN A CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FORMAL
EXECUTION AND TENDER OF A SHARE CERTIFICATE.
Though no certificates were issued evidencing their interest, both plaintiff and def,endant were stockholders in Valley
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. Each originally subscribed and paid for 1950 shares. (R-89, 96). Each owned
stock in the corporation, though apparently neither had a
certificate evidencing such stock ownership. (R-61). A stockholder is one who owns stock in a corporation. (See Fletcher
Cyclopedia Corporations Vol. 11, Page 65, paragraph 5094).
A certificate of stock is not the ~stock itseH. It is merely
written evidence of the ownership thereof and of the rights
4
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and liabilities resulting from such ownership. It is merely
the paper representative of incorporeal rights and stands on
a footing similar to other muniments of title. (See 18 C.J.S.
721, paragraph 258).
l·ssuance of a certificate is not necessary to make one a
stockholder. The fact :that plaintiff did not have physical
possession of a certificate «in no manner affects his ownership of ,the stock." See Robey vs. Hardy, 63 Utah 231, 224
P. 889 at 892, also Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Volume
11, Page 60, Paragraph 5092.
As is pointed 'Out in the factual narrative, because of internal difficulties in corporate affairs, plaintiff and defendant
exchanged words and each offered to buy the other out.
Thereafter an agent of defendant Gibbs negotiated with plaintiff for the sale to Gibbs of plaintiff's interest in the Valley
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. Gibbs knew what the
corporate interest of plaintiff was. (R-14, 21). Exhibit 1 was
prepared by McDermond, an agent of Gibbs, and by the
sister of Gibbs, and was presented to plaintiff for execution.
The language is the language of those acting for and on behalf
of Gibbs, Plaintiff executed the instrument and was then given
a check for $750.00 as part payment for his interest.
The intent of the parties is clearly and plainly expressed
by the instrument, Exhibit 1. (R-87). It is dear that plaintiff
sold . and defendant purchased plaintiff's interest in Valley
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated as of January 24, 1955.
The language used is used in the present tense. The instrument states in part, "... I hereby sell, transfer and assign ... ,
and do hereby appoint Richard Gibbs owner. . . ." Exhibit
1 is the instrument of sale, transf.~r and assignment. This
is obvious from the use of the words "sell, 'transfer and assign,"
1

5
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the use of the term ·'hereby" as well as the use of the word
"owner." Gibbs is not called the purchaser but is called
"owner." Defendant, in Paragraph 3 of his answer, admits
as much. (R-3). The subject matter of the sale, transfer and
assignment, namely that which plaintiff had and that of which
Gibbs became "owner" is clearly spelled out in the instrument
as all of plaintiff's "... right, title and interest to the shares
of capital stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises Inc...."
Some months after the transfer to Gibbs of plaintiffs
interest in Valley Amusement Enterprizes Incorporated, defendant Gibbs decided that he did not want to pay for what
he had purchased and now claims that the instrument drawn
by his agent and his sister, which he had "accepted" (R-72)
does not meet the technical requirements of the law.
Defendant erroneously asserts that the Uniform Stock transfer act is applicable to this fact situation and erroneously asserts that 16-3-1 Uta:h Code Annotated 1953 provides the exclusive manner for the transfer of shares of stock in a corp>mtion.
16-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part:
..Title to a certificate and to the shares represented
thereby ...
16-3-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part:

"An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or
to the shares represented thereby . . ."
16·3-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part:

" 'Title' means legal title and does not include a
merely equitable or beneficial ownership or interest."
6
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16-3-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part:
". . . The provisions of this chapter apply to certificates heretofore issued or hereafter to be issued . . ."
The uniform stock transfer act assumes the existence of
a certificate representing shares in a corporation. The act
was designed to give such certificates certain attributes of
negotiability. Each of the provisions referred to by the defendant is applicable only where there is a certificate in existence. In this instance there is no such certificate because
a certificate was never issued. Certainly the uniform stock
transfer act does not say that all corporations must issue certificates. It merely says that if certificates are issued which
represent shares in a corporation then centain formalities must
be complied with in transferring those certificates or the shares
represented thereby. Clearly it does not prohibit a stockholder
in a corporation which has not issued certificates from selling,
transferring or assigning his interest in that corporation in a
manner other than by certificate transfer.
The case of Markis vs. Melis, 50 Utah 544, 167 P. 802-04,
relied on by defendant is clearly distinguishable from the instant
fact situation.

That case was decided prior to the enactment

of the unifonn stock transfer act and construed a portion of
the transfer law then in effect. The statute therein construed
has been somewhat modified and is now s·et forth at 16-2-34
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The court in that case held that
under Title 14 C. L. Utah 1907 at 330 a purchaser of stock was
entitled to a stock certificate when such a certificate had been
issued, was in existence and in the possession of the seller.
In the instant case no stock certificate was ever is·sued. There
is nothing in 16-2-34 which prohibits the transfer or assign-
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ment of a stock interest in a corporation in the manner used
in the present case.
Under the terms of Exhibit 1, defendant was the "owner"
and was granted "full power of substitution in the premises."
If he desired a certificate he could compel the corporation to
issue him one.
1

The case of Rock vs. Gustavson Oil Co., 204 P. 96 cited by
the defendant is distinguishable from the case before the
court. The instant case is not one of the '~ordinary" cases the
court there is talking about. In that case plaintiff acquired
from a defendant corporation, an option to purchase certain
stock, said option to be exercised within ten days after the
happening of a condition, namely the discovery of oil at a certain drilling site. The purchaser exercised the option, made
payment to the corporation for 50,000 shares of stock, the
defendant to deliver the certificates within a reasonable length
of time, the purchaser and the defendant corporation each
being aware that the stock was being acquired for purposes
of "resale." The stock certificates were not delivered within
a reasonable time and the public market price of the stock
went down. Plaintiff claims he was damaged because of the
inability to deliver certificates to his purchasers at the high
market price. No efforts were made in· any fashion to transfer
the shares.
1

Plaintiff in the instant case was an individual stockholder
to whom a certificate had not been issued by the corporation;
defendant was aware no certificate had been issued; defendant
was not acquiring the corporate interest of plaintiff for "resale"
to the public; plaintiff transferred to defendant by written instrument prepared by defendant's agent and defendant's sister
all his right, title and interest to shares in Valley Amusement

8
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Enterprises Incorporated; plaintiff's duties were all performed
under the 'COntract, the only executory duty remaining being
that of the defendant to pay the amount due; defendant has
at no time made demand upon plaintiff for the delivery to
him of a stock certificate.
We submit that plaintiff performed all he was duty bound
to perform under Exhibit 1 and that defendant is duty bound
to pay :the remaining about due under the instrument. We
feel that in the light of 1the argument outlined above that the
court incorrectly ordered that a stock cerificate be delivered
to defendant by plaintiff and that that portion of his judgment
was in error and should be modified and that plaintiffs judgment for $1350.00, interest and costs should be affirmed.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT IN PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD
AT 3793 SOUTH STATE STREET; THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
THE SO-CALLED LEASEHILD AND EVEN IF THERE
WERE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASEHOLD IT IS NOT MATERIAL
BECAUSE THE LEASEHOLD WAS NOT THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE BARGAIN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.
There is recited in the articles of incorporattion that a
lease was transferred to the corporation by a Mr. McDermond
in return for shares in the corporation. Both plaintiff and
defendant were apparently swtisfied that such a lease existed
because each attested to the fact that the leasehold given to
the corporation was reasonably wo.l'lth the amount allowed by
9
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the corporation and each attested as of their own knowledge
that the capital stock subscribed f.or by each of the incorporators including that subscribed for by Mr. McDermond was
paid for. (R-95, 96).)
Defendant tes·tified that the leasehold does not in fact exis.t;
that he learned of this fact sometime after January 24 rthough
the record i·s somewhat confused as to the exact time when
this purportedly was learned by defendant; that a Mr. Hong
returned to the leasehold and occupied a part thereof in April
of 1955; that the leasehold was not on the whole building
but just on the back end. (R-21, 22); that he went to see the
property owner sometime in May after a demand had been
made for more rent. (R-22); that the Club opened in June
(R-19); :that the Club ran during the 90 day period. (R-24).
The record is in a state of confusion as to just when defendant learned there was no lease on the premises occupied
by Valley Amusement. There is some confusion as to whether
the so-called lease was on the whole premises at 3793 South
State Street or merely on the back portion of the premises.
It appears to be clear, however, that he learned of the faot
at least one and one-half to two months prior to the time
plaintiff filed his lawsuit and :that during that time defendant
attempted to negotiate a written lease with the landlord and
that the corporate activities were carried on at the building
during this period. (R-30).
Plaintiff asserts that defendant is now precluded from
denying the existence of a lease that defendant had previously
acknowledged existed when he attested as to its value; that
he is precluded from avering the non-existence of a lease
which, through his acts and deeds he maintained existed at
the time of corporate organization. As a matter of policy,
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the law should not now allow :this defendant to aver the nonexistence of a lease he solemnly and under oath proclaimed
existed. (R-95, 96).
The articles of incorporation recite that Mr. M·cDermond
transferred the lease 1to the corporation. If, as defendant
claims, there was in fact, no lease than one may reasonably
infer that Mr. McDermond knew there was no lease. McDermond represented defendant Gibbs in acquiring for Gibbs
plaintiff's interest in Valley Amusemerrt Enterprises Inc. If
defendant's agent, McDermond knew there was no lease, then
such knowledge is attributable to his principal Gibbs, and
Gibbs cannot now complain he was laboring under a mistake
of fact. The general rule is stated at 2 AM. Jur. 294, Paragraph 376, as follows:
"According to the majority view which i·s based
upon the theory of a presumption that that agent performs :the duties of his agency by disclosing 1to the
principal any knowledge which he may possess necessary or material to the protection of the principal's
interests, the fact that the knowledge wHh which the
principal is sought to be charged was acquired by
his agent prior to ·his agency does not prevent the application of the general rule charging the principal with
the knowledge ·of his agent."
A review of the whole record, the nature of defendant's
testimony, the usual confusion of his testimony as to his relation
with M·cDermond and his understanding in relation to the lease
·support the assertion that not only did his agent, McDermond,
know of the status of the lease but tha1t the defendant himself
knew.
Defendant argues as if he were purchasing a leasehold from
plaintiff rather than an interest in a corporation. Defendant
11
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himself 1testified (R-15) that no conversations were had concerning a lease when discus·sing their bargain. Defendant's
testimony shows that internal corporate difficulties prompted
his purchase of plaintiffs interest. The record is barren of any
evidence that defendant would have acquired control of the
corporation ·even with the purchase of plaintiff's interest so as
to control the leasehold if one existed. Defendant himself
testified 1that there were assets other than the leasehold at the
time of his purchase of plaintiffs interest. (R-75). Defendant
acquired plaintiffs interest in whatever there was. Defendant
testified he knew what plaintiffs interest was. (R-14).
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION OF
THE AMOUNT PAID OVER TO PLAINTIFF.
Defendant does not allege lack of consideration to support
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant. He asserts a
failure of consideration because of the alleged non-existence
of a lease which he apparently hoped was part of the assets
of :the corporation and which he alleges makes the corporate
shares transferred to the defendant by plaintiff witthout value.
As of January 24, 1955, plaintiff conveyed to defendant
all of his "right, title and interest to tthe shares of capital stock
in Valley Amusement Eenterprises Inc. . . ." The conveyance
was complete as of ·that date. Defendant testified that the corporation had assets other than the so-called leasehold as of that
date. (R-75).
Defendant acquired each and every right of plaintiff as a
stockholder in the •corporation. It is basic that the frustration
of an expectation or anticipation of the purchaser does not
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amount to a failure of consideration. He cannot escape liability
for the purchase price merely because the venture turned out
badly or as not as profitable as he expected it to be. (See Fletcher
Cyclopedia Corporations Volume 12a, Page 26, Paragraph 5574).
The facts in this instance do not justify recission or restitution in favor of defendant. Defendant made no timely effort
to rescind afiter his so-called discovery of the non-existence of
a lease. He attempted t'O negotiate a lease and in fact carried
on his activities rf.n make the corporation an operating company.
Only rut the time when 'his rightful obligation to pay was being
pressed did he then, through ·his ·counsel, make demand for the
return of his money and even then he failed to tender back all
that had been ·Conveyed.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted :that the trial court's judgment was ·correct
in substance, that plaintiff's judgment for $1'250, interest and costs
should be affirmed and thrut defendant is entitled to neither
reversal nor judgment on his counterclaim.

Respectfully submitted:
JED W. SHIELDS

Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
Spencer Van Noy
Received.___ _ _ _ _ _ __ ·copies of the foregoing brief

this_ _ day of_ _ _ _ _ _ _, 1957.
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